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ABSTRACT 
This study measures the willingness of male and female farmers to pay for climate-smart technology in 
rice. Rice is the most important crop in India in terms of area, production, and consumption. It is also the 
biggest source of greenhouse gas emissions among all crops. Direct-seeded rice (DSR) with drum seeder, 
a climate-smart technology, requires less labor and water and is more climate friendly than transplanted 
rice; yet, its adoption is slow in India. The authors of this study carried out a discrete choice experiment 
with 666 farmers from the Palghar and Thane districts of Maharashtra to measure their willingness to pay 
for drum seeders—a key piece of equipment for adopting DSR. Both male and female farmers were 
surveyed to capture the heterogeneity in their valuation of the key attributes of drum seeders. Although 
both male and female farmers prefer cheaper drum seeders, the marginal valuation of different attributes 
of the drum seeder varies by the farmers’ gender. The authors also used the Women Empowerment in 
Agriculture Index (WEAI), developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), to 
collect self-reported data on the role and say of women in agriculture. The respective gender roles in the 
family and on the farm seem to explain some of this difference. Men have a greater say over how the 
family spends the cash. Accordingly, men tend to have a higher willingness to pay for attributes that 
increase income (increase in yield) or reduce cash costs (reduction in the seed rate). Women contribute a 
large share of the labor for transplanting rice, much of which is unpaid work on family farms. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, women seem to value labor saving significantly more than their male counterparts. 
Further, the WEAI data show that although men in the family have more say, women do have an 
influence on decisions regarding crop production and the adoption of new technologies, to an extent. 
Therefore, to enhance the adoption of drum seeders, the product designers and extension workers should 
also target women.  
Keywords:  direct-seeded rice, choice experiment, gender roles, RPLM, willingness to pay (WTP), 
India, gender 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rice is the most important crop in India in terms of area, production, and consumption. Transplanting rice 
seedlings grown in nurseries to puddled soils is the dominant method of rice establishment in India and 
the rest of Asia (Pandey and Velasco 2002). Growing transplanted rice is more water and labor intensive 
and emits more greenhouse gases into the environment as compared with direct-seeded rice (DSR) with 
drum seeders. Rising wage rates, increased water scarcity, and growing environmental concerns make 
DSR a more attractive option, both economically and environmentally. Because DSR offers higher 
returns and allows more intensive cropping, both state and central governments in India are promoting 
adoption of DSR through extension and capital subsidies on essential equipment, such as drum seeders. 
Still, the adoption of DSR is slow in India.  
This paper uses discrete choice experiments to examine farmers’ preferences for growing DSR 
using drum seeders and explores heterogeneity in these preferences. Agricultural decisions are not 
undertaken by a unitary household (Duflo and Udry 2004). Female farmers may have preferences that 
differ from those of the men in their families, and adoption of a new technology may affect them 
differently. This finding is particularly true for rice cultivation, because women contribute significantly 
more toward rice-based agriculture than men. Studies on the gender division of labor in rice production 
reveal that women in South Asia contribute 60–80 percent of the required labor (Ricepedia 2016). A shift 
from transplanting to direct seeding may significantly affect the livelihoods of women, because, in most 
parts of India, transplanting is their traditional task. If women are unpaid laborers, the shift will reduce the 
drudgery of transplanting.1 If they are paid laborers, however, it will deprive them of a source of income. 
The same reasoning holds for weeding. There is more weed growth in DSR and, therefore, an increased 
need for manual weeding. Thus, women are major stakeholders in the adoption of new technologies and 
practices such as DSR.  
Few studies measuring willingness to pay (WTP) for new technologies include women in the 
sample (Kamwamba-Mtethiwa et al. 2012). Even studies that look at the heterogeneity in the preference 
between male and female farmers often rely on a comparison of male- and female-headed households. 
But this approach provides only limited information on a small segment of female producers2 and ignores 
the majority of female farmers who live in male-headed households. Therefore, this paper aimed to 
survey a man and a woman from each farming family in the sample to measure their marginal valuations 
for different attributes of drum seeders.  
The study uses a discrete choice experiment with 666 female and male farmers from 395 families 
in two predominantly rice-growing districts (Thane and Palghar) in Maharashtra to measure their WTP 
for a drum seeder, which is the main equipment used in DSR. The findings indicate interesting 
similarities and differences in marginal valuations of different attributes of drum seeders between female 
and male farmers in the sample. Both women and men prefer cheaper drum seeders and have positive 
valuations for reductions in labor use and seed rate and for increase in crop yield; however, men value 
increase in crop yield more than women do. Women, on other hand, have significantly higher valuation 
for labor savings. Interestingly, although the decision to buy, rent, or use machines is almost entirely in 
the man’s domain, more women than men in the sample showed any interest in adopting drum seeders. 
The findings show that 42 percent of women and 73 percent of men went with the status quo in the choice 
experiments.  
                                                     
1 According to Kanchi (2010), 79 percent of rural women are engaged in agriculture and allied activities, as compared with 
63 percent men; more than 50 percent of female agricultural workers are unpaid family workers. 
2 Fewer than 10 percent of all farming households in India are female-headed households (Government of India 
2013). 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief discussion on the 
benefits and limitations of DSR in comparison to the more common transplanted rice. Section 3 discusses 
the empirical methodology used in the paper. A description of the data is provided in Section 4. Section 5 
presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 6 draws some policy implications from the 
research.  
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2.  TRANSPLANTED RICE, DIRECT-SEEDED RICE, AND DRUM  
SEEDERS IN INDIA 
Transplanting is the dominant mode of rice establishment in India. Transplanted rice requires more labor 
and water and emits more greenhouse gases into the environment than DSR. In the past, DSR was mainly 
practiced in areas with low population density and where low or uncertain water availability prevented 
intensification of rice systems. However, the area farmed using DSR has been increasing in recent years 
in response to rising wage rates, increasing labor, and growing water scarcity (Pandey and Velasco 2005). 
DSR has several advantages over transplanted rice. DSR saves on labor by as much as 50 percent (Pandey 
and Velasco 2005; Bhushan et al. 2007). When rainfall at planting time is highly variable, as has been the 
case in many parts of India in recent years (Kishore, Joshi, and Pandey 2015), DSR may help reduce 
production risk. It is also less vulnerable to terminal drought and facilitates higher cropping intensity by 
saving the time needed to grow rice nurseries for transplanted rice.  
Direct seeding has some disadvantages as well. Because there is higher weed growth with DSR as 
compared with transplanted rice, farmers have to use weedicides or manual labor to control weeds. Thus, 
a part of the labor and money saved by direct seeding gets used for weeding. Poor establishment of seeds 
is another potential problem that affects crop yields. Although using drum seeders for sowing seeds 
mitigates this problem, drum seeders are not easily available to farmers. In addition, the reduction in labor 
requirement for rice cultivation under DSR may reduce the wage income of women and men who are 
engaged in transplanting.  
A new drum seeder costs 4,200–5,400 Indian rupees (INR) (Reddy, Sreenivasulu, and Manohar 
2016). The average working life of a drum seeder is nearly 7–10 years, and it is easy to maintain. Chavan 
and Palkar (2010) and Chandrasekhrarao, Jitindranath, and Murthy (2013) assumed the variable cost of a 
drum seeder to be less than 10 percent of its total fixed cost. The government of India and the state 
governments in rice-growing regions of India are trying to promote adoption of DSR as an alternative to 
transplanting in order to save water, reduce vulnerability of rice crop to vagaries of rainfall, mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions, and remove drudgery involved in transplanting (Kumar and Ladha 2011; 
Mahajan, Chauhan, and Gill 2013). Yet, the adoption of DSR has been slow in India despite capital 
subsidies on equipment like drum seeders and extension support to farmers.  
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3.  EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This paper uses discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to analyze farmers’ preferences for drum seeders. 
DCE is a quantitative technique for eliciting preferences that can be used in the absence of revealed 
preference data. The method involves asking individuals to state their preference over hypothetical 
alternative scenarios, goods, or services. Each alternative is described by several attributes, and the 
responses are used to determine whether preferences are significantly influenced by the attributes. It also 
allows estimation of marginal values of these attributes (Mangham, Hanson, and McPake 2009) and the 
extent to which individuals are willing to trade one attribute for another (Drummond et al. 2005). In this 
study, DCE allows the authors to elicit farmers’ marginal values or willingness to pay for increase in yield 
and reduction in labor requirement for rice cultivation using drum seeders.  
In the agricultural and resource economics literature, the DCE methodology has been used to 
analyze consumer preferences for environmental amenities (Selassie and Kountouris 2010; Bennett and 
Blamey 2001; Birol and Das 2010, 2012; Bell, Shah, and Ward 2014), ecosystem services (Hurd 2006; 
Villalobos and Huenchuleo 2010), food quality attributes (Lusk and Schroeder 2004; Ortega et al. 2011), 
conservation agriculture (Ward et al. 2015), electricity service (Sagebiel 2011), and new or improved 
production technologies (Ward et al. 2014; Ward and Singh 2015; Arora, Bansal, and Ward 2015). 
DCE has its theoretical foundation in Lancaster’s model of consumer choice (Lancaster 1966), 
which regards a good as a bundle of attributes and considers the value of a good as a function of these 
attributes and their levels. Consumer choices are modeled using the random utility theory, which assumes 
that the individual will choose the alternative that yields the highest utility. The utility has both a 
deterministic component and a random, individual-specific component that is unobservable to the 
researcher.  
Because farmers are heterogeneous, their preferences for different attributes of a drum seeder 
could also be heterogeneous. A common method of evaluating preference heterogeneity is the estimation 
of random parameters logit models (RPLM), also called mixed logit. This is a highly flexible model that 
allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution pattern, and correlation in unobserved factors 
(McFadden and Train 2000; Petrin and Train 2003). Further, this model can use any distribution for the 
random coefficients. In this study, the coefficients corresponding to all attributes, except for price, vary 
normally; price is restricted to be constant to ensure a negative marginal utility of price and easier 
computations of WTP. 
Respondents are asked to choose among a series of alternative attribute bundles; the net utility of 
an alternative is a linear function of the individual’s observed characteristics plus an additive error term 
(Greene 2008). The econometrician, however, does not observe this utility. What is observed is the stated 
preference for different attributes and levels. Given resources and other factor endowments, we assume a 
randomly selected individual 𝑖𝑖 who chooses repeatedly in 𝑡𝑡 situations between several alternatives 𝑛𝑛(𝑗𝑗). 
Each alternative accommodates attributes k with levels A𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 , which vary over alternatives. This can be 
represented as follows:  
 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = { 1 if 𝑈𝑈∗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = max� 𝑈𝑈∗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(1),𝑈𝑈∗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(2), … ,𝑈𝑈∗𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑗𝑗)�  and 0 otherwise}. (1) 
For simplicity, we assume indirect utility functions 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 for each alternative n and individual i to 
be linear with respect to attribute levels 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. For each alternative, there are utility-sensitive elements eint 
that cannot be observed by the researcher but are known to the individual. This simple formulation of 
indirect utility function can be written as follows: 
 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 =  𝛽𝛽1 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑘𝑘 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑘𝑘 + . . . + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 (2) 
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where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the level of attribute k for alternative n, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘  is the corresponding utility coefficient, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 
is a stochastic component of utility that is independently and identically distributed across individuals and 
alternative choices. This function captures the unobserved variation in preferences and errors in an 
individual’s perception and optimization. The WTP for each attribute is thereby distributed in the same 
way as the attribute’s coefficient. In the random parameters logit model, the taste and preference of 
attributes for each individual is unobserved and varies randomly; this can be interpreted as marginal 
utilities. The ratio of two such marginal utilities is the marginal rate of substitution of one for the other. 
The WTP is the marginal rate of substitution between an attribute and the cost attribute (that is,−  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
); 
the WTP value gives necessary compensation in monetary terms for a one-unit deterioration of an 
attribute in order to maintain the same level of utility. The WTP can be estimated as follows: 
 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 =  −  𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝛽𝛽𝑁𝑁 ,𝑛𝑛 ∈ [1,𝑁𝑁 − 1], (3) 
where 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 is the estimated parameter for the nth attribute. The negative sign is used because the marginal 
utility of income is negative of the marginal disutility of cost, thus ensuring that the marginal utility of 
favorable attributes will be positive. A negative of this ratio implies that the WTP for favorable attributes 
is represented as a positive sum.  
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4.  DATA 
The sample for this study consists of 329 men and 337 women farmers from 395 households in tribal 
areas of Maharashtra. The survey sample was formed using a multistage sampling approach. The first 
stage consisted of two districts—Thane and Palghar—where a Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security (CCAFS) project to promote climate-smart agriculture is underway (Figure 4.1). The land in the 
study area is undulating, receives high rainfall (2,300 mm/yr), and is largely rainfed. Most farmers belong 
to the socially and economically disadvantaged community of scheduled tribes (STs). With 10.51 million 
STs, Maharashtra has the second largest tribal population in India, after Madhya Pradesh. The study area 
is close to Mumbai, one of the largest cities in India. A large number of young men from rural areas of 
both districts migrate to Mumbai for work, resulting in labor scarcity and feminization of agricultural 
labor. In the second stage, six rice-growing blocks were selected from the two districts: four from Palghar 
(Jawhar, Mokhada, Wada, and Palghar) and two from Thane (Shahapur and Murbad).  
Figure 4.1 Location of study 
 
Source:  Authors’ creation. 
Note:  In June 2014, the Thane district was bifurcated into two districts: Thane and Palghar. 
The number of blocks drawn from each district is proportional to the share of rice production in 
that district. Within each block, five villages were randomly selected from which to draw households. For 
each of these 30 villages, door-to-door listing was used to prepare a roster of all rice-growing households, 
with 15 households being randomly selected for the choice experiment. The authors tried to select a man 
and a woman engaged mainly in agriculture from each household in the sample for choice experiment; 
however, it was possible to find both a male and a female farmer in only 271 families. In the other 124 
families, either a man or a woman was surveyed. Thus, the sample consists of 337 women and 329 men. 
Of these, 542 men and women belong to the same family. In each family where both the man and the 
woman were interviewed, they were interviewed separately to elicit their independent WTP for the drum 
seeder, without influence from their partner or any other family members.  
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The most relevant attributes of drum seeders and their levels were identified after a careful review 
of literature and consultations with agronomists and extension experts familiar with the study area. The 
attributes were then pretested, as were the levels in focus groups with male and female farmers in the 
study area. The authors conducted 41 focused group discussion (FGD) sessions in 6 villages; 185 men 
and 70 women attended the sessions. The authors organized FGDs for women and men separately to get 
their independent inputs on key attributes that may guide their choice of a drum seeder for DSR.  
Paddy yield is one of the most important attributes that farmers consider when deciding to adopt a 
new technology or variety. Studies show that yields could increase by a significant amount per hectare 
with the adoption of DSR (Ali, Erenstein, and Rahut 2014; Singh et al. 2008). Rice is a labor-intensive 
crop; farmers in the study area face acute labor scarcity, especially during time-sensitive operations like 
transplanting and harvesting. Therefore, labor saving is the second most important attribute for 
respondents. DSR avoids nursery raising and transplantation and thus reduces the labor required for 
growing rice. As mentioned in Section 2, because more weeds grow in DSR than in transplanted rice, 
farmers have to apply weedicides in DSR. Weedicide cost is the third consideration for farmers. Finally, 
DSR requires a drum seeder. The price of a drum seeder was included as an attribute with four distinct 
levels (4,000, 5,000, 6,000, and 7,000 INR) to allow for the estimation of money metric measures for 
WTP and welfare comparisons. Table 4.1 summarizes the attribute-level specifications for the choice 
experiment.  
Table 4.1 Selected attributes and the levels used in the choice experiment for direct-seeded rice with 
drum seeder 
Attribute Definition Levels 
Seed rate (kg) Amount of seed required for 1 acre of land 5, 10, 15, 20 
Labor saved (in person-days) Number of labor saved in 1 acre of land 8, 10, 12 
Yield increment (kg) Yield increment is considered in DSR 50, 100, 150, 200 
Weedicide cost (INR) Weedicide costs in DSR with drum seeders is 
considered 
400, 600, 800, 1,000 
Drum seeder price (INR) Price of the drum seeder 4,000, 5,000, 6,000, 7,000 
Source:  Authors.  
Note:  DSR = direct-seeded rice; INR = Indian rupees. 
The authors used the “dcreate” module in Stata to generate a D-optimal design that takes into 
account all main effects. This module used the modified Fedorov search algorithm (Cook and Nachtsheim 
1980; Zwerina, Huber, and Kuhfeld 1996; Carlsson and Martinsson 2003) to create an efficient design. 
The authors generated 36 unique choice sets that were randomly allocated into 4 blocks of 9 choice sets 
each to reduce the probability of respondent fatigue. Respondents were then randomly assigned to 
respond to the choice tasks presented in one of these four groups, with an even number of households 
allocated to each group. Each choice set consisted of two alternatives and a status quo option. (Figure 4.2 
provides an example of a choice set.) Illustrations (as in Figure 4.2) were used to increase respondents’ 
comprehension of the attributes and levels presented in each choice set.  
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Figure 4.2 Example of choice set presented to survey respondents (Block1: Set 3) 
DSR (drum seeder) 
characteristics 
Option A Option B My current practice 
 
 
Seed rate 
 (kg) 
 
 
5 kg/acre 
 
 
10 kg/acre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Status Quo: 
 
 
I like neither 
A nor B. I prefer 
to cultivate with 
same traditional 
method. 
 
 
 
Labor saved (person-
days) 
 
 
12 person-days/acre 
 
 
8 person-days/acre 
 
Yield increment (kg) 
 
 
200 kg/acre 
 
 
50 kg/acre 
 
 
Cost of equipment 
(INR) 
 
 
5,000 INR 
 
 
4,000 INR 
Weedicide cost (INR)  
1,000 INR/acre 
 
600 INR/acre 
Source:  Authors.  
Note:  DSR = direct-seeded rice; INR = Indian rupees. 
In addition to collecting data for the choice experiment, the authors conducted a survey to collect 
information on household and individual characteristics (including demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, main and subsidiary occupation, and interest in agriculture) and rice cultivation 
(production; productivity; and use of various inputs, such as family and hired labor, irrigation, fertilizer, 
and so on) from each respondent independently. These additional sources of information are relevant for 
further understanding the determinants of the WTP, especially as it pertains to preference heterogeneity 
both between and within households. Table 4.2 summarizes the respondents in the sample on some of 
these important dimensions. 
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics of the sample households 
 Variable Women Men 
t-test of significance 
difference in 
means/proportions 
Land and personal characteristics     
Average age of respondent (years) 41.5 46.4 -4.7839*** 
Own land (acres) 3.7 3.9 -0.49615 
Family size (number of persons) 6.3 6.6 -1.2454 
Farming experience (years) 24.3 26.9 -2.7506*** 
Education    
Illiterate (%) 48.2 25.6 6.0302*** 
Primary (%) 19.0 23.5 -1.3949 
High school (%) 16.7 24.1 -2.3748** 
Above high school (%) 16.1 26.8 -3.3802*** 
Institutional membership, extension, and awareness   
Member of registered farmer group (%) 1.2 3.1 -1.6845* 
Member of self-help group (%) 36.6 48.0 -2.9725*** 
Like farming as a profession (%) 32.3 33.3 -0.27135 
Is soil tested earlier (%) 9.5 8.3 0.57256 
Migrate for off-farm employment opportunities (%) 17.6 21.4 -1.2511 
Crop insured at any time (%) 6.0 8.9 -1.4359 
Markets and institutional variables    
Access to input market (%) 26.8 45.0 -4.8802*** 
Access to output market (%) 20.8 38.7 -5.0435*** 
Access to credit facilities (%) 9.2 28.0 -6.2394*** 
Access to weather advisory (%) 27.2 39.8 -3.4346*** 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Female farmers in the sample are, on average, younger and less educated and have fewer years of 
experience in farming than the men in their families.3 The women have poorer access to input and output 
markets, credit and extension, and weather advisory. Women are also less likely to be members of farmer 
institutions and other village-level representative bodies, such as the village council (gram sabha). Two-
thirds of men and women in the sample dislike farming as a profession because of the drudgery, low 
profits, and high risk. 
Respondents were also asked questions from the Women Empowerment in Agriculture Index 
(WEAI) to measure the roles and extent of women’s engagement in the agriculture sector in five 
domains—agricultural production, resources, income, leadership, and time. WEAI measures the 
empowerment, agency, and inclusion of women in the agriculture sector in an effort to identify ways to 
overcome those obstacles and constraints (Alkire et al. 2013). The WEAI module was administered to 
both male and female respondents in the sample. The module consists of a series of questions; 
respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they could make decisions, if they wanted to, in different 
domains in their lives. They were asked to give a rating from 1 to 5, with 1 denoting “no say” and 5 
denoting “complete say.” Table 4.3 presents the self-reported ratings of women and men in the sample on 
their say in different decision domains in the family using the WEAI module.  
                                                     
3 This is because women are almost always younger than their husbands in Indian marriages. 
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics from the Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index  
Variable Men Women Difference t-test 
To what extent do you feel you can make decisions if you want(ed) to: 
Food crop farming 4.671 3.894 0.778 9.893*** 
 (0.036) (0.069)   
Agricultural production 4.434 3.634 0.801 9.381*** 
 (0.040) (0.076)   
Inputs to buy 4.521 3.691 0.829 10.224*** 
 (0.039) (0.072)   
Crops to grow 4.407 3.732 0.675 8.108*** 
 (0.046) (0.069)   
Crops to market 4.451 3.495 0.956 6.951*** 
 (0.063) (0.142)   
Own wage salary 4.378 3.904 0.475 5.848*** 
 (0.044) (0.069)   
Who, according to you, can decide whether to buy, sell, or rent/mortgage (self)? 
Farm equipment (nonmechanized) 0.379 0.092 0.287 9.262*** 
 (0.027) (0.016)   
Farm equipment (mechanized) 0.0703 0.002 0.067 4.713*** 
 (0.014) (0.002)   
Leadership: Public speaking 
Do you feel comfortable speaking up in public? 0.406 0.274 0.132 3.545*** 
 (0.027) (0.025)   
Time: Workload and leisure 
Did you work more than 10.5 hours in the previous 24 hours? 0.539 0.762 -0.222 -6.142*** 
 (0.028) (0.023)   
How would you rate your satisfaction with your 
available time for leisure activities? 4.5 3.494 1.006 5.705*** 
 (0.119) (0.129)   
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
Women in the sample worked longer and enjoyed less leisure time than the men; they also had 
significantly less say in household decision making, including decisions about crop production and the 
use of crop income. Among different aspects of farming, decisions to purchase, sell, or rent mechanized 
or nonmechanized farm equipment are almost entirely the men’s domain, with women having very little 
say. Extension and subsidy policies for mechanization should not reinforce this gender asymmetry 
between contribution to and control over farming. The WEAI module also shows that although the men in 
the sample households are more privileged than women, the latter do have a considerable say in many 
different decision domains of farming. 
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5.  RESULTS 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the random parameters logit model. The table shows three sets of results: 
one for the full sample of respondents (pooled) and one each for the male and female farmers in the 
sample. The top panel shows the posterior mean values of the marginal utility parameter, which explains 
the relative value associated with each attribute level. The bottom panel shows the posterior mean values 
of standard deviations for the normally distributed marginal utility parameter, indicating the heterogeneity 
in farmers’ preferences for each attribute. Except for the weedicide cost, the standard deviations of all 
attributes in both the full sample and the women-only sample are statistically significant, indicating a 
clear rejection of homogeneous preferences for these attribute levels.  
Table 5.1 Estimation of random parameters logit results 
 Variable Pooled Men Women 
Random marginal utility parameters 
Seed rate (kg) -0.01567** -0.01906** -0.01482 
 (0.00641) (0.00803) (0.0103) 
Labor saved (person-days) 0.20763*** 0.14591*** 0.2896*** 
 (0.01716) (0.02251) (0.02433) 
Yield increment (quintals) 0.95118*** 1.30505*** 0.68066*** 
 (0.06642) (0.10559) (0.08177) 
Weedicide cost (INR) -0.00004 -0.00015 -0.00007 
 (0.00012) (0.00022) (0.00016) 
Nonrandom marginal utility parameter 
Price of DSR (INR) -0.00088*** -0.00093*** -0.00086*** 
 (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) 
Distribution parameters 
Standard deviation (seed rate) 0.04658*** 0.027997* 0.07928*** 
 (0.00838) (0.01645) (0.01028) 
Standard deviation (labor saved) 0.13533*** 0.07062** 0.13779*** 
 (0.00838) (0.01208) (0.01282) 
Standard deviation (yield increment) 0.20774* -0.01035 0.54613*** 
 (0.10978) (0.01179) (0.11268) 
Standard deviation (weedicide cost) 0.00018 0.00008 0.00037** 
 (0.00018) (0.00011) (0.00017) 
Log likelihood -4213.1788 -1788.1942 -2319.042 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  INR = Indian rupees; DSR = direct-seeded rice. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
The regression coefficients on the price of the drum seeder are negative in all three cases, 
indicating that both male and female farmers prefer cheaper drum seeders to the more expensive ones. 
This coefficient can be used to generate money-metric WTP measures for each attribute level. Table 5.2 
shows the estimated WTPs of each attribute for the whole sample and for subsamples of female and male 
farmers.  
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Table 5.2 Estimated willingness to pay (RPL Model) for direct-seeded rice drum seeder attributes 
 Variable Mean Lower Upper 
Pooled 
Seed rate (kg) -17.814 -33.788 -2.920 
Labor saved (person-days) 236.038 207.591 264.995 
Yield increment (quintals) 1081.309 951.363 1202.904 
Weedicide cost (INR) -0.042 -0.305 0.209 
Men 
Seed rate (kg) -20.561 -38.689 -2.928 
Labor saved (person-days) 157.416 120.789 193.560 
Yield increment (quintals) 1408.008 1228.597 1577.995 
Weedicide cost (INR) -0.164 -0.595 0.272 
Women 
Seed rate (kg) -17.175 -44.165 7.086 
Labor saved (person-days) 335.648 295.986 379.038 
Yield increment (quintals) 788.898 611.896 955.412 
Weedicide cost (INR) -0.084 -0.437 0.247 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  INR = Indian rupees. Confidence interval derived using bootstrap procedure introduced by Krinsky and Robb (1986) 
based on 1,000 random draws with mean and variance-covariance matrix of the estimated model parameter. 
On average, women are willing to accept a marginally smaller amount for an increase in the seed 
rate than men (17.2 INR/kg for women versus 20.6 INR/kg for men). Values for both men and women are 
close to the average price of the paddy seed in the region. When it comes to labor saving, women, who 
contribute the bulk of the labor for rice cultivation, value it significantly more than the men in their 
families (335.6 INR/person-day versus 157.4 INR/person-day). The average valuation for labor saving by 
women is slightly more than the agricultural wage rates reported in the study area, while men value it less 
than the going wage. Unlike labor savings, men seem to value yield enhancements more than women 
(1,408.0 INR/quintal for men versus 788.9 INR/quintal for women). The value placed on additional yield 
by men is around the farm-harvest price of paddy in the region. Average marginal valuation of yield 
enhancement is less than the market rates. Thus, although both men and women care about the price of 
the drum seeder and the cost savings or yield increases it may bring, the relative valuations of men and 
women vary in expected ways. Men care more about cost savings and yield enhancement, whereas 
women have relatively higher valuation for reduction in labor requirement.  
Figure 5.1 plots the kernel density of marginal WTP for different attributes of DSR for both male 
and female farmers. Table 5.3 presents results of the t-test of differences between mean values of 
marginal WTP for different attributes of DSR. The mean values of marginal WTP for seed savings is 
higher for men than for women; men also have a higher marginal WTP for higher yield. Women, 
however, have a significantly higher marginal WTP for labor saving due to DSR than men. The kernel 
density plots show wider dispersion in marginal WTP for all attributes for women than for men. Figure 
5.2, which plots the kernel density for the total WTP for a typical drum seeder, shows that the total WTP 
for a typical DSR peaks at a lower value for men than for women. Again, women’s WTP is more widely 
dispersed than the men’s. Comparing the average total WTP for a drum seeder with its market price 
suggests that a capital subsidy is needed to promote its adoption by farmers in the study area.  
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Figure 5.1 Individual-level marginal willingness to pay for direct-seeded rice attributes 
Panel A: WTP for seed and labor 
 
Panel B: WTP for yield and weedicide 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  WTP = willingness to pay. Marginal willingness to pay (in Indian rupees) is shown on the horizontal axis. 
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Table 5.3 T-test results of the difference between men and women marginal WTP for direct-seeded 
rice with drum seeder attributes 
 Variable Men Women Diff. T-test of sig. diff. in means 
Seed rate (kg) -20.45 -16.48 -3.98 -1.27 
Labor saved (person-days) 157.04 336.53 -179.49 26.39*** 
Yield increment (quintals) 1407.96 787.41 620.54 33.83*** 
Weedicide cost (INR) -0.16 -0.08 0.08 12.39*** 
Source:  Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  INR = Indian rupees. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level of significance 
Figure 5.2 Individual-level total willingness to pay for direct-seeded rice with drum seeder 
  
Source:  Authors’ estimates 
Note:  Total willingness to pay (in Indian rupees) is shown on the horizontal axis. 
In this choice experiment, farmers faced 5,940 choice situations in which they had to choose 
between either of two different combinations of DSR with drum seeder and the status quo option of 
transplanted rice. One in five times, farmers in the sample chose to stay with the status quo option. Table 
5.4 compares the average probability of selecting either one of the two DSR combinations over the status 
quo between men and women in the family (household fixed effect) for the same choice sets (card fixed 
effect). Men are 20 percent less likely than the women in their families to choose DSR over the status 
quo. Thus, the female farmers in the sample seem to show more interest in adopting this new technology 
than men. 
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Table 5.4 Linear probability model comparing men’s and women’s probability of selecting direct-
seeded rice with drum seeder over the status quo option in choice situations  
Dependent variable: “Choose either of the two DSR with drum seeder combinations” All households 
Male respondent -0.1950*** 
 (0.0187) 
Constant 0.9952*** 
 (0.0931) 
Card fixed effect Yes 
Household fixed effect Yes 
No. of observations 5867 
R2 0.4025 
Source:  Authors’ estimate. 
Note:  DSR = direct-seeded rice. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, 
which are clustered at the individual level. 
Next, the authors ran simple linear regressions, with the mean total WTP for the drum seeder as a 
dependent variable and a set of respondent and household characteristics as independent variables; these 
were used to understand factors that determine willingness to adopt (Table 5.5) for the full sample and the 
subsample of households in which both a man and a woman took part in the choice experiment. Although 
the dependent variable in Table 5.5 is some measure of WTP, it can be taken as a measure of the 
probability of adoption (Ward et al. 2015). Men have significantly lower average total WTP for drum 
seeder than women, which is contrary to the findings of Akter et al. (2016), who found that women’s 
WTP for weather-indexed insurance in Bangladesh was significantly less than men’s. WTP is not higher 
for farmers who own more land. However, educated farmers are more likely to adopt a drum seeder than 
illiterate ones. Farmers who like farming as a profession and are aware of government policies, such as 
the minimum support price of rice, have a significantly higher WTP. Farmers who said in the post 
experiment survey that they were considering adoption of DSR are also likely to pay more for the drum 
seeder.  
Respondents with greater workload (those who worked more than 10.5 hours in a day) are more 
likely to adopt this labor-saving technology, though the difference is statistically not significant. Working 
in government workfare program, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, and 
having better access to input and output markets, credit facilities, and weather advisory are positively 
associated with WTP for drum seeder; however, all these coefficients are statistically not significant.  
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Table 5.5 Determinants of total willingness to pay for the drum seeder 
Dependent variable : Mean WTP Full sample Households with 2 respondents 
Land owned (hectares) 2.8128 2.5410 
 (2.0987) (2.6095) 
Average age of the respondent (years) 0.7084 1.0835 
 (0.6196) (0.7579) 
Gender (men = 1, else = 0) -93.1631*** -88.7659*** 
 (14.1457) (16.5899) 
Scheduled tribe (yes = 1, else = 0) 11.5258 43.3328** 
 (18.0883) (20.0730) 
Primary education (%) 51.6877** 54.3138** 
 (24.3932) (25.3882) 
High school education (%) 40.5572* 52.1023* 
 (22.4817) (26.6340) 
Above high school education (%) 63.4655*** 73.9729*** 
 (19.0683) (22.7417) 
Planning to use DSR drum seeder (%) 98.8973*** 111.9289*** 
 (20.3575) (23.8922) 
Migrate for off-farm employment opportunities? (%) -18.0504 -2.5952 
 (21.3456) (18.2813) 
Member of self-help group? (%) 14.8968 23.6014 
 (18.4077) (19.9791) 
Like farming as a profession? (%) 30.7038** 39.1254** 
 (13.9497) (17.6413) 
Awareness of minimum support price? (%) 100.0034*** 101.6704*** 
 (26.8772) (26.9441) 
Workload (work for more than 10.5 hours) 25.3472 14.3723 
 (18.1257) (21.7355) 
Working in MGNREGS  13.3335 8.9300 
 (22.5393) (27.1465) 
Access to input market (%) 9.8028 6.1369 
 (24.5999) (23.7012) 
Access to output market (%) 19.4466 34.4348 
 (24.3787) (22.7103) 
Access to credit facilities (%) 8.6710 12.7241 
 (15.6803) (18.6563) 
Access to weather advisory (%) 17.8597 15.5068 
 (14.7894) (18.7852) 
Constant 1095.2106*** 998.7731*** 
 (52.8667) (53.6846) 
Number of observation 650 527 
R-squared 0.2052 0.2120 
Source:  Authors’ estimate.  
Note:  WTP = willingness to pay; DSR = direct-seeded rice; MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme. The dependent variable is individual-level estimated mean total willingness to pay. Village-level 
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
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6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper examines male and female rice farmers’ preference heterogeneity for DSR with drum seeders 
in Maharashtra, a state in the western part of India where both the farmers and the state government are 
interested in DSR. In 2011, women constituted 46.2 percent of all agricultural laborers and 32.9 percent 
of all cultivators in India. Women’s contribution in rice-growing areas is even higher. Women perform 
the bulk of the backbreaking work involved in transplanting rice, weeding fields, and harvesting. Direct 
seeding of rice with equipment such as drum seeders can reduce the labor required in rice cultivation (as 
well as offer other benefits, such as yield gain, lower seed requirement, higher profits, and reduced carbon 
footprint). However, India’s extension system is male dominated and tends to ignore female farmers in 
promoting new technologies and practices. For example, very few women in the study sample reported 
having received any extension inputs from government or private extension agents. The extension system 
tends to target only men, perhaps because women in the family traditionally have very little say in the 
purchase, adoption, or use of farm equipment and less control over decisions to hire farm laborers and 
spend family income. This may be one reason that much of the research on technology adoption also 
ignores female farmers.  
In recent years, however, there is a growing emphasis in all development programs, including 
programs to promote climate-smart agriculture, to actively target female farmers, who are more 
vulnerable to climate change (Arora-Jonsson, 2011) but are often left out due to existing gender 
inequalities in education, ownership of and access to land and financial resources, ability and freedom to 
interact with the outer world, and the reach of extension programs. Women may have very different 
preferences from the men in the family, given their different roles and responsibilities. This is especially 
true in decisions related to rice farming in South Asia, where women do bulk of the work. Therefore, it is 
important that studies exploring preference for climate-smart technologies in rice farming include female 
farmers in their sample.  
This study tried to account for heterogeneity in preferences for DSR with drum seeders between 
women and men by drafting both female and male farmers in the discrete choice experiment. The findings 
suggest that any strategy to promote the adoption of DSR drum seeders should take heterogeneous 
preferences of female farmers into account. The findings also indicate that women have different relative 
valuations for different attributes of drum seeders. Women seem to value reduction in labor requirement 
(and possibly the accompanying drudgery) significantly more than the men, whereas men value reduction 
in seed costs more than the women. Women’s higher marginal valuation for labor saving is probably due 
to the fact that they contribute the bulk of the labor for rice cultivation. Both women and men prefer 
cheaper drum seeders and are likely to adopt them only if they are heavily subsidized from their current 
market prices. However, a key finding of this experiment is that women are more interested in adopting 
DSR with drum seeders and are willing to pay more for it than the men in their families.  
The study’s findings of women having higher WTP for a new technology runs somewhat contrary 
to the existing literature on technology adoption, which shows that women have slower observed rates of 
adoption of a wide range of technologies than men (Doss and Morris 2000) and lower WTP for new 
products, such as weather-indexed insurance (Akter et al. 2016), probably due to greater time and 
resource constraints, lower human capital endowment (education and exposure to the outer world), and 
poorer access to complementary inputs (Kamwamba-Mtethiwa et al. 2012). In this sample, women are 
more interested in and are willing to pay more for a new technology that promises to reduce the 
backbreaking work.  
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Women in rural Maharashtra work harder in rice cultivation, but they have a significantly lower 
say than the men in household decisions related to farming, such as choice of crops, inputs to buy, and the 
adoption and purchase of new technologies and equipment. This study also found, however, that although 
women have less say than the men in their families, they are not completely powerless. In fact, women do 
have a considerable say in many household decisions. Therefore, existing development programs, 
including agriculture extension, should not ignore women when promoting new climate-smart 
technologies, products, or practices, as ignoring women may reinforce the existing gender inequalities. 
Given women’s interest in new and better technologies, extension for the promotion of DSR drum seeder 
is likely to be more successful if it also targets female farmers and highlights the attributes of the 
technology that are of greater interest to them.  
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